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The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its ac-
tivities .... [I] t is against the enterprising ambition of this department
that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions.
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.2
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to
be without effect ....
4
There is no U.S. Constitution any more when it comes to the drug war.
I. INTRODUCTION
Diane Monson was a sick woman. A degenerative spinal disease
caused her constant back pain. She had tried dozens of traditional
medicines, but all had failed to ease her suffering. Finally, on her
doctor's recommendation and under the authority of state law, she
began cultivating six marijuana (cannabis) plants for her personal,
medicinal use at home.
The U.S. government learned of Monson's activities, and on Au-
gust 15, 2002, agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) en-
tered her home. Under the authority of federal law and the War on
Drugs, they confiscated and destroyed Monson's six plants. Since the
United States never prosecuted Monson as the felon that federal law
and propaganda proclaim her to be, she and Angel Raich, another
sick California woman using cannabis on a doctor's recommendation,
brought suit to prevent future DEA raids. Although the Ninth Circuit
Assistant Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University. Thanks to Profes-
sorsJohn Scheb, Brian Krumm, andJohn Davis for their feedback on this Article.
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2 Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
Id. at 174.
4 Michael W. Lynch, Battlefield Conversions, REASON, Jan. 2002, at 36, 42 (quoting Michael
Levine, former Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs Service, and Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms official).
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Court of Appeals ruled in their favor,' the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Congress can criminalize the private possession and me-
dicinal use of cannabis, even on a licensed physician's recommenda-
tion and under the protection of state law.
Raich arises at the nexus of three sources of law. It began as a con-
flict, brewing for some time,' between state and federal legislation.
The state law is Proposition 215, enacted by California ballot initiative
in 1996 and codified as the Compassionate Use Act (CUA). s The
CUA, under which appellants in Raich possessed and used marijuana,
is intended
[t]o ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed ap-
propriate and has been recommended by a physician who has deter-
mined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana
in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glau-
coma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana pro-
vides relief.)
See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005).
6 Raich, 545 U.S. at 42. For other Compassionate Use Act (CUA)-related cases, see, for ex-
ample, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 497-98 (2001), which
held that: (1) no implied medical necessity exception exists to prohibition of manufacture and
distribution of marijuana established by Controlled Substances Act (CSA), and (2) the district
court thus could not consider medical necessity when exercising its discretion to fashion injunc-
tive relief. See also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting physicians
to discuss medical prescription of marijuana); County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d
1192, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (addressing the constitutionality of the CSA); Wo/Men's Alliance
for Med. Marijuana v. United States, No. 02-MC-7012 JF, 2002 WL 32174210, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 24, 2002) (holding that hospice was not entiled to return of seized marijuana).
7 As the Mayor of Santa Cruz had observed, "Clearly, state law and federal law are on a colli-
sion course." Christopher Krohn, Why I'm Fighting Federal Drug Laws from City Hall, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2002, at A15. More recently, "Denver... became the first city in the nation to wipe
out all criminal and civil penalties for adults caught possessing a small amount of marijuana."
Stephanie Simon, Denver Is First City to Legalize Small Amount of Pot, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at
A10.
8 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2007). For background on Proposition
215, see ALAN BOCK, WAITING TO INHALE: THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA (2000), and
Robert J. MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, and
Places, in RAND STUDIES IN POLICYANALYSIS 378, 378-80 (2001).
For background on federal and state responses to medical marijuana, see generally
RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND PROHIBITION POLITICS
chs. 1-3, 5-7 (2004); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the Commerce Clause:
Why Developments in California May Limit the Constitutional Reach of the Federal Drug Laws, 1999
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 471, 475-82 (1999); Alex Kreit, Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana:
Should the States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1793-800 (2003); Alistair Newbern,
Comment, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal Prosecution of State-Legalized Medical Marijuana Use After
United States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1575, 1586-89 (2000); Dennis Newitt, Comment, The
Medical Use of Marijuana: State Legislation, Judicial Interpretation and Federal Drug Laws, 4J. LEGAL
ADVOC. & PRAC. 156, 158-68 (2002). Every State that has voted on medical marijuana has legal-
ized it. Ethan Nadelmann, An End to Marijuana Prohibition: The Drive to Legalize Picks Up, NAT'L
REV., July 12, 2004, at 30.
9 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (b) (1) (A) (West Supp. 2007).
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The federal law, enacted in 1970, is the Comprehensive Drug Pre-
vention and Control Act, popularly called the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA)."' The CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I controlled
substance, which means that in Congress's view, it has a high poten-
tial for abuse, no officially accepted medicinal uses, and no safe level
of use under medical supervision." Thus, except for rare controlled
experiments, federal law flatly prohibits the possession or use of even
small quantities of marijuana.
2
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,"" federal law
preempts contrary state law. 14 At the same time, Congress can act
only within its constitutional powers. Among the most important of
these is the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several
States,"" which Congress expressly relied upon in enacting the CSA.'6
For sixty years, this reliance was all that was required to justify federal
power to enact the law in question. 7 Since 1995, however, the Su-
preme Court has established precedent striking down certain federal
laws as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. "8
Though federal law preempts contrary state law, it can do so only if
the federal law is within Congress's power in the first place."' Consti-
tutional law, specifically Commerce Clause jurisprudence, is thus the
third and overarching source of law within which Raich had to be re-
solved.
10 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2006).
1 Id. § 812(b) (1). On the rest of the CSA scheduling system, see BOCK, supra note 8, at 223-
24; Gouldin, supra note 8, at 477-78.
1 In United States v.Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, the Supreme Court ruled that there
is no medical necessity exception to enforcement of the CSA. 532 U.S. 483, 498-99 (2001).
]3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1991) (interpreting the Supremacy
Clatse to grant federal law power over conflicting state law); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629,
645-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (discussing the implications of New York in
cases concerning state medical marijuana statutes).
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (identifying Congress's jurisdictional basis for adopting the CSA);
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005) (discussing congressional authority to enact the CSA).
17 See generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1257 (2003);
Newbern, supra note 8, at 1600-05.
18 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-11 (2000) (holding the Violence Against
Women Act unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers); Jones
v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854-59 (2000) (discussing what activities qualify as "commerce");
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-84 (1995) (finding the federal Gun-Free School
Zones Act unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause atthority).
M9 As the Ninth Circuit notes, the Supreme Court in Oakland Cannabis "expressly reserved"
the question whether the CSA exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Raich v.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005).
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Raich is a landmark case that has already generated its first law re-
view symposium. It involves a unique mixture of opinions,'• "21 23 / . . 24
clauses, cases, and distinctions, and is a major event in the 5000-
year history of humanity's relationship with the cannabis plant.2' It
could be called the perfect storm of federalism, science, civil liberty,
and the War on Drugs, and it has yielded some unusual alliances on
the Supreme Court. Over the past generation, it is the Court's "con-
servatives" that have tended to rule against Congress in Commerce
20 Symposium, Federalism After Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 743 (2005).
21Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, delivered the
opinion of the Court. Raich, 545 U.S. at 4. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
T Besides the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the
Necessary and Proper Clause all play key roles in Raich. On the last, see Brannon P. Denning &
Glenn H. Reynolds, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 915, 923-26
(2005), for a discussion of the implications of Raich for Necessary and Proper Clause jurispru-
dence.
2 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-11 (commenting upon the scope of Congress's Com-
merce Clause powers); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-84 (delineating the scope of Congress's Com-
merce Clause powers); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (stating the scope of Con-
gress's Commerce Clause powers); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824)
(noting the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819) (discussing the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers). All
figure prominently in Raich.
24 Among others we shall consider, the distinctions between applied and facial challenges
and the distinctions between medicinal and recreational cannabis use play important roles in
Raich. On the prospects of facial challenges after Raich, see Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison
Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 770-76 (2005), for a
discussion of the as-applied analysis, as opposed to the facial challenge at issue in Raich. See also
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 916-18 (discussing the implications of Raich for the fu-
ttre of as-applied challenges to federal law).
25 Records dating to 2800 B.C. show that man has found three broad uses for the cannabis
plant-medicinal, industrial (commerce in hemp), and recreational (where religion, psychology,
literature, sociology, crime, and race come more filly into play). See, e.g., EDWARD D.
BLOOMQUIST, MARIJUANA: THE SECOND TRIP (1971) (discussing the history of marijuana us-
age); BOCK, supra note 8, at 131-78 (discussing the medicinal uses of marijuana); RICHARDJ.
BONNIE & CHARLES H. VWrHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA
PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (1974); NICK BROWNLEE, THE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO
CANNNABIS (2003) (noting the history, global and health impact of marijuana); ALBERT
GOLDMAN, GRASS ROOTS: MARIJUANA IN AMERICA TODAY (1979) (telling the history of mari-
juana); LESTER GRINSPOON &JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1993)
(exploring the different medicinal uses for marijuana in the treatment of diseases); THE
MARIHUANA PAPERS (David Solomon ed., 1966) (noting the historical, sociological, cultural,
literary, and scientific impact of marijuana); MARK D. MERLIN, MAN AND MARIJUANA: SOME
ASPECTS OF THEIR ANCIENT RELATIONSHIP (1973) (focusing upon the origin of the marijuana
plant in human history); ED ROSENTHAL & STEVE KUBBY, WHY MARIJUANA SHOULD BE LEGAL 35-
60 (2003) (discussing marijuana's health effects, industrial, and medicinal applications); LARRY
SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS: THE HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN AMERICA (1979) (detailing the role
marijuana plays in American society); SOLOMON H. SNYDER, USES OF MARIJUANA (1971);
MARTIN TORGOFF, CAN'T FIND MY WAY HOME: AMERICA IN THE GREAT STONED AGE, 1945-2000
258-93 (2004) (discussing the golden age of marijuana in America); Michael Aldrich, History of
Therapeutic Cannabis, in CANNABIS IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 35-55 (Mary Lynn Mathre ed., 1997)
(summarizing the history of the medicinal use of marijuana).
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Clause challenges.2 ' Invalidating the CSA as applied in Raich, how-
ever, would have cleared the way for States to enact liberal social pol-
icy free from interference by Washington. It may be that Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, who had sided with the "conservatives" in earlier
Commerce Clause cases, sided with the "liberals" in Raich to ensure
that Congress retains power to frustrate liberal social policy. 2 Justice
Stevens assures us that "[w]ell settled law controls our answer.,28  At
the end of the day, the Justices simply had to choose which of two ba-
sic, conflicting structural principles would prevail: deference to na-
tional power or the enforcement of limits on national power. By a
vote of 6 to 3, they chose the former.
21 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-11 (striking down the Violence Against Women Act as
unconstitutionally exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause powers); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-84
(finding the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional because it exceeded Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (hold-
ing that insofar as the 1974 amendments operated directly to displace the States' ability to struc-
ture employer-employee relationships in areas of traditional governmental functions, they were
not within the authority granted Congress by the Commerce Clause).
27 As one editorial page observed, "Federalism and the commerce clause bring out the hypo-
crite in all of us." Editorial, Unconstitutional Cannabis, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at B12. New-
bern thus speaks of "the 'liberal paradox'-the odd position in which liberal advocates of state-
legalized medical marijuana use are placed in arguing for a reduced role for the federal gov-
ernment against a history that equates such arguments with a time in which states clung to their
autonomy as a means of preserving a racist past." Newbern, supra note 8, at 1590. Beyond this,
the Attorneys General of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi submitted an amicus curiae brief
supporting respondents Raich and Monson. See Brief for the States of Alabama et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ashcroft v. Raich, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-
1454). The irony of traditionally "conservative" state governments supporting respondents
seeking to ensure access to medicinal marijuana was remarked upon in the press. See, e.g.,
Margot Roosevelt, Red States Weigh in as the Court Goes to Pot, TIME, Nov. 22, 2004, at 20 (high-
lighting the peculiar political alliances forged in Raich).
As for the conservatives, one commentator argues thatJustices Scalia's and Thomas's parting
of the ways in Raich can be explained by the former's emphasis on judicial minimalism and the
latter's emphasis on originalism. See Eric. R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of
the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 791, 793 (2005) ("Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia
both favor originalism and judicial minimalism, butJustice Thomas stresses the former over the
latter, and justice Scalia the latter over the former."). As forJustice Kennedy's apparent change
of direction from Lopez and Morrison, see Adler, supra note 24, at 768-70, for a discussion of vari-
ous explanations that have been proposed to explain Justice Kennedy's surprising conversion
from a "once-reliable vote for a judicially enforced federalism ... into a defender of federal
power." While it has been suggested that Justices Scalia and Kennedy voted as they did based
on their substantive opposition to liberal drug laws, one commentator dismisses this as idle
speculation. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-
Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 879, 908 (2005) ("[I]t is idle to speculate that Justices
Kennedy and Scalia betrayed their conservative colleagues for personal or political rea-
sons .. ").
Raich thus reminds us that broad versus narrow interpretations of structural constitutional
phenomena, such as the permissible scope of national power, cannot be neatly classified as "lib-
eral" or "conservative." The issue in a case like Raich is fundamentally about where governmen-
tal power should rest, yet that yields one's preferred policy outcome only if the level of govern-
ment one thinks ought to be empowered to make law adopts one's substantive policy
preferences.
28 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6 (2005).
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In Part II, I will sketch Raich's factual and constitutional landscape
in order to extract and articulate these two principles, and in turn the
two major rules, that have emerged from the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. In Part III, I argue that while Justice Stevens's
reasons for ruling for Congress in light of the first rule are under-
standable, because he fails to respond to the force of the second rule
and its underlying principle, his decision is ultimately indefensible
and should be overturned at the first opportunity. 2 More immedi-
ately, however, since the Court might not revisit Raich soon, I assert
that it is fitting and just that patients, doctors, caregivers, and law en-
forcement officials in states with medicinal cannabis laws have served
notice that Raich will have no impact on their activities. They plan, in
effect, to engage in borderline civil disobedience by defying the fed-
eral prohibition. Congress thus emerges as an irrelevant tyrant in this
area of public policy, although it certainly could not have done so
without the DEA's and the Court's help. I conclude that if States,
along with other western liberal democracies, continue their recent
trend toward the more rational, less destructive drug policy of harm
reduction, Congress will eventually have to follow, contrary though
such a scenario is to the theory of Gonzales v. Raich.
II. RAICH'S FACTUAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
Let us cover the ground more thoroughly. In his opinion for the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Pregerson succinctly presented the facts as fol-
lows:
Appellants Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson (the "patient-
appellants") are California citizens who currently use marijuana as a
medical treatment. Appellant Raich has been diagnosed with more than
ten serious medical conditions, including an inoperable brain tumor,
life-threatening weight loss, a seizure disorder, nausea, and several
chronic pain disorders. Appellant Monson suffers from severe chronic
back pain and constant, painful muscle spasms. Her doctor states that
these symptoms are caused by a degenerative disease of the spine.
Raich has been using marijuana as a medication for over five years,
every two waking hours of every day. Her doctor contends that Raich has
tried essentially all other legal alternatives and all are either ineffective or
result in intolerable side effects; her doctor has provided a list of thirty-
five medications that fall into the latter category alone. Raich's doctor
states that foregoing marijuana treatment may be fatal. Monson has
been using marijuana as a medication since 1999. Monson's doctor also
contends that alternative medications have been tried and are either in-
29 On how a future Court might do this, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting
Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 743, 743-50 (2005). Professor Barnett represented the respon-
dents in Raich.
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effective or produce intolerable side effects. As the district court put it:
"Traditional medicine has utterly failed these women ... ."
Appellant Monson cultivates her own marijuana. Raich is unable to
cultivate her own. Instead, her two caregivers, appellants John Doe
Number One and John Doe Number Two, grow it for her. These care-
givers provide Raich with her marijuana free of charge. They have sued
anonymously in order to protect Raich's supply of medical marijuana. In
growing marijuana for Raich, they allegedly use only soil, water, nutri-
ents, growing equipment, supplies and lumber originating from or
manufactured within California. Although these caregivers cultivate
marijuana for Raich, she processes some of the marijuana into cannabis
oils, balm, and foods.
On August 15, 2002, deputies from the Butte County Sheriff's De-
partment and agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") came
to Monson's home. The sheriffs deputies concluded that Monson's use
of marijuana was legal under the Compassionate Use Act. However, after
a three-hour standoff involving the Butte County District Attorney and
the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California, the DEA
30agents seized and destroyed Monson's six cannabis plants.
Fearing raids in the future and the prospect of being deprived of
medicinal marijuana, the appellants sued the United States Attorney
General John Ashcroft and the Administrator of the DEA Asa Hutchison
on October 9, 2002. Their suit seeks declaratory relief and preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief. They seek a declaration that the CSA is
unconstitutional to the extent it purports to prevent them from possess-
ing, obtaining, manufacturing, or providing cannabis for medical use.
The appellants also seek a declaration that the doctrine of medical ne-
cessity precludes enforcement of the CSA to prevent Raich and Monson
from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal
medical use.
3 '
On March 5, 2003, the district court denied the appellants' motion
for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that, "despite the
gravity of plaintiffs' need for medical cannabis, and despite the concrete
interest of California to provide it for individuals like them," the appel-
lants had not established the required "'irreducible minimum' of a like-
lihood of success on the merits under the law of this Circuit ..
A. The Commerce Clause Merits
As this background indicates, though Raich centers on the substan-
tive domain of the Commerce Clause, the case came to the District
Attorney General Ashcroft had "vowed to 'escalate the war on drugs.'" ERIC SCHLOSSER,
REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 67 (2004).
.1 Since the Ninth Circuit ruled for appellants on the Commerce Clause issue, it did not ad-
dress their other arguments, including the medical necessity claim. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352
F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
32 Id. at 1225-26.
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Court and Ninth Circuit in the remedial context of a request for a pre-
liminary injunction. The questions are fused, however, since the sub-
stantive question must be addressed in order to resolve the remedial
issue. As Judge Pregerson explains, "The traditional test for granting
preliminary injunctive relief requires the applicant to demonstrate:
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a significant threat of ir-
reparable injury; (3) that the balance of hardships favors the appli-
cant; and (4) whether any public interest favors granting the injunc-
tion. 3 3 The Ninth Circuit gives the merits prong of this test, which
embodies the Commerce Clause analysis, the lengthiest treatment.
In this analysis, three cases are central: Wickard v. Filburn,4 United
States v. Lopez, s" and United States v. Morrison.3b
B. Wickard, Lopez, and Morrison
Wickard involved amendments to the 1938 Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act (AAA). To stimulate trade during the Depression, Con-
gress sought to stabilize the price of wheat in the national market.
This in turn required regulating the volume of wheat in interstate
commerce, so the AAA provided national acreage allotments for
wheat with quotas for individual farmers. Mr. Filburn owned a small
Ohio farm. Although he was allotted 11.1 acres for his 1941 wheat
crop, he grew 23 acres, intending to keep the excess crop for his own
consumption. He was thus fined under the AAA, but he refused to
pay and filed suit challenging the law's application to him under the
Commerce Clause. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Robert
Jackson upheld the law as applied to Mr. Filburn. Rejecting the for-
malist distinctions of earlier cases, Jackson wrote:
It is well established by decisions of this Court that the power to regulate
commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodi-
ties in that commerce are dealt in .... It can hardly be denied that a fac-
tor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a
substantial influence on price and market conditions. 7
In Wickard, thus, Justice Jackson provides an early enunciation of
the rule that Congress can regulate any activity that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. The question immediately arises how
a single wheat farmer could possibly have such an effect, and the an-
swer is found in Wickards establishment of the aggregation principle.
"That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
3 Id. at 1227 (emphasis added). While Judge Pregerson mentions an alternative test, he
notes the two "are not inconsistent," and indeed, "likelihood of success on the merits" is a key
factor in both. Id.
34 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
35 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
37 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
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trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that
of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.""" Moreover, even
"if we assume that [the wheat] is never marketed, it supplies the
needs of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by
purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense com-
petes with wheat in commerce.' 3 ' Establishing "perhaps the most far
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activ-
ity,"40 thus, Justice Jackson held that "even if appellee's activity be lo-
cal and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
,,41economic effect on interstate commerce ....
Issued more than fifty years after Wickard, Lopez was a landmark
ruling.42 At issue was § 9 2 2(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 (GFSZA), which made it a federal crime for anyone knowingly
to possess a firearm in a place he knew or should have known was
within 1000 feet of a public or private school. 43 Mr. Lopez was ar-
rested and charged under the state counterpart of the GFSZA, but
those charges were dropped when federal agents charged him with
I" d. at 127-28. As Newbern notes, "Wickard stands for the proposition that no matter how
personalized or local an economic actor's conduct might be, if her conduct, multiplied, would
affect interstate commerce, it may fall under Congress's regulatory control." Newbern, supra
note 8, at 1601.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
41 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. Pushaw argues that in Wickard, "judicial review under [the ag-
gregation principle] became an empty formality." Pushaw, supra note 27, at 890.
42 See generally Adler, supra note 24, at 754-59; Charles W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After
Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 823, 835-41 (2005) (discussing
the significance of Lopez). Lopez has been described as the opening shot in a Commerce Clause
revolution. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 1257-62; Newbern, supra note 8, at 1632;
Cass R. Sunstein, The Rehnquist Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 2004, at 32. Newbern notes
that "[w]ithin eight months of Lopez's decision, more than eighty challenges to federal Com-
merce-Clause-based criminal statutes were filed in district courts. Four years after Lopez was
handed down, that number had grown to 566 cases filed in federal courts." Newbern, supra
note 8, at 1607 (footnote omitted). As Green thus observes, "the Lopez decision is central to the
'new federalism revival."' Marcus Green, Comment, Guns, Drugs, and Federalism: Rethinking
Commerce-Enabled Regulation of Mere Possession, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2543, 2545 (2004). This "new
federalism revival" consists of three interrelated lines of cases involving the Tenth Amendment,
Eleventh Amendment, and the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2546 n.27. In Calabresi's view,
"[p]erhaps the most striking feature of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been the re-
vival over the last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional federalism." Steven G. Calabresi, Fed-
eralism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24,
25 (2001).
Greenhouse has opined that "the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution ... appeared this
term to stall in its tracks," Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2004, at Al, but she relies primarily on an Eleventh Amendment case, Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), for this assertion. On the Eleventh Amendment, see Newbern,
supra note 8, at 1614-17.
43 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (2006).
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violation of federal law.44 Upon conviction, Lopez appealed, chal-
lenging § 9 22(q) as beyond Congress's commerce power on its face.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist upheld the Fifth• • 45
Circuit's reversal of Lopez's conviction. Though the Court did not
directly overrule Wickard, "it carefully limited the reach of
Wickard ....
Issued five years after Lopez, Morrison was, in Professor Adler's view,
"the real breakthrough for enumerated powers jurisprudence. 47
Morrison involved a provision of the federal Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) that provided a civil remedy for gender-motivated vio-
lence.48 Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Tech, claimed that
another student had raped her and made statements showing a gen-
der motivation for the attack. She sued him under the VAWA provi-
sion, but the District Court dismissed, partly on grounds that the civil
remedy was beyond Congress's commerce power. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, as did the Supreme Court. Speaking for the same 5-4 ma-
jority as in Lopez, the Chief Justice wrote, "a fair reading of Lopez
shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue
was central to our decision in that case.... Gender-motivated crimes
of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. " '
"[T] he Court indicated it was serious about enforcing the 'noninfin-
ity principle,"'''0 by regarding skeptically any interpretation that would
51in effect convert the commerce power into a general police power.
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court identified three broad categories
of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power-
the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the use of the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, and those activities that, in the ag-
gregate, substantially affect interstate commerce. In both cases, only
the third category applied. As the Chief Justice wrote in Lopez, for
example:
The first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of: § 9 22(q)
is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor
is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity
through the channels of commerce; nor can § 922(q) be justified as a
44 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
45 Id. at 568.
46 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
47 Adler, supra note 24, at 759. For general notes on Morrison, see id. at 759-62.
48 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2006).
49 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610, 613 (2000). As the Court wrote, "Indeed, we
can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of
its victims." Id. at 618.
" .Denning & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 1260.
5 Though Morrison figures prominently in our analysis, it is distinct from Lopez and Raich in
that 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 sought to regulate not possession, but rather, physical violence.
52 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
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regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of
interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce. Thus, if § 9 22(q)
is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of
an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.53
Elaborating the meaning of this third category, then, and building
on Wickard, Rehnquist reaffirmed what I shall call the first Lopez
rule-the rational basis/substantial effects rule. As he wrote, "the
Court has ... undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed
for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate
commerce."5 4 If the Court finds that Congress had a rational basis to
enact a law challenged on Commerce Clause grounds, the first Lopez
rule directs it to defer to Congress and uphold the law.
The first Lopez rule is thus rooted in the enduring principle of
deference to national power in a federal system. Indeed, this was
among the key considerations in drafting the Constitution; the Arti-
cles of Confederation had placed inadequate power in the central
government. 5 ' As Madison thus argued, where national uniformity
and efficiency are essential, presumptive deference to national powerY56 57 58
is warranted. In both McCulloch and Gibbons, further, Marshall
relied on this principle in ruling for Congress.59
53 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. As Rehnquist wrote in Morrison,
Petitioners do not contend that these cases fall within either of the first two of these
categories of Commerce Clause regulation. They seek to sustain § 13981 as a regulation
of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Given § 13981's focus on gen-
der-motivated violence wherever it occurs (rather than violence directed at the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, interstate markets, or things or persons in interstate
commerce), we agree that this is the proper inquiry.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
Z Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
55 See, e.g., AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 68-70 (Kenneth Dolbeare & Michael Cummings
eds., 4th ed. 1998) (describing the Articles of Confederation); THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexan-
der Hamilton), supra note 1, at 309 (arguing for a stronger representative republic than that
afforded by the Articles); I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 24-28 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION] (recognizing the key weaknesses of the
Articles of Confederation).
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 280-81. Moreover, "Congress
can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a
unified purpose to build a stable national economy." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy &
O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
18 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
r In McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316, Marshall famously deferred to Congress's power
to charter a second Bank of the United States. In Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 3, he gave the
Commerce Clause itself its first great elucidation, upholding the validity of a federally granted
license to navigate the waters between New York and New Jersey. While the principle underly-
ing the rational basis/substantial effects rule is a legitimate one, Professor Pushaw criticizes the
Court for reaffirming the rule without providing clear guidance for its application. As he
writes, the Court
neglected to provide any concrete guidelines for determining what cotnts as "substan-
tial" or how this effect should be calculated....
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While Lopez thus reaffirmed the rational basis/substantial effects
rule, it also asserted a countervailing rule. As Rehnquist wrote,
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his,.possession of the fire-
arm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
I shall call this rule-that mere possession, standing alone, is not
economic activity regulable under Congress's commerce power-the
61
second Lopez rule. While the first Lopez rule is rooted in the princi-
ple of deference to national power, the second Lopez rule is based on
62the equally fundamental principle of limits on that power. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist quoted ChiefJustice Marshall in Gibbons,
... [Further,] the "substantial effects" test depends on two utterly subjective judg-
ments. The first concerns the level of generality at which the regulated activity is charac-
terized .... A second ambiguity is whether the "substantial effect" must be demonstrated
affirmatively... or can be hypothesized through a "rational basis" test ....
Pushaw, supra note 27, at 895, 904-05.
60 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. Reinforcing this point, Justice Kennedy in his Lopez concurrence
refers to "our duty to recognize meaningful limits on the commerce power of Congress." Id. at
580 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring). While commerce and economic activity are not
identical, O'Connor notes that "[i]n Lopez and Morrison, we suggested that economic activity
usually relates directly to commercial activity." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 50 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61 As O'Connor writes, "Lopez makes clear that possession is not itself commercial activity."
Raich, 545 U.S. at 50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62 Together, these principles of deference to, and limits on, national power embodied in the
Lopez rules reflect the two basic tasks of liberal constitutionalism-to empower government and
to disempower government. In Madison's words, "In framing a government which is to be ad-
ministered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the govern-
ment to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." THE FEDERALIST
No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 322. These two principles are also Marshall's legacy in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 528 (1922) (hold-
ing that the enactment of the Packers and Stockyards Act was clearly within congressional
power under the Commerce Clause); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S.
342, 359-60 (1914) (holding that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late railroads); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (upholding Congress's plenary
power to enact the Federal Anti-Lottery Act under the Commerce Clause). There, for example,
the Court followed Marshall's federalist lead, upholding exercises of federal power under the
Commerce Clause, even where Congress appeared to be pursuing social rather than economic
goals. On the other hand, in Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1936) (holding that
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 was beyond the power of Congress because the
regulation of labor on a local level was beyond the purview of the Commerce Clause), A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549-51 (1935) (holding the Live Poultry
Code invalid because it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and attempted
to regulate intrastate transactions that affected interstate commerce only indirectly), and Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918) (holding that Congress did not have the power to
regulate interstate commerce in the products of child labor), the Court drew sharp lines strik-
ing down federal laws allegedly grounded in the commerce power, even where Congress pur-
sued economic as well as social goals.
Rehnquist noted that the second Lopez rule "may in some cases result in legal uncertainty."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. As he went on to observe, however, "[t]he Constitution mandates this
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It is not intended to say that these words [the Commerce Clause] com-
prehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried
on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the
same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a
power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be re-
stricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.... The
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated and that something, if we
regard the language, or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclu-
sively internal commerce of a State.
uncertainty by withholding from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enact-
ment of every type of legislation." Id.63 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added) (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 74).
While Justices Stevens and Scalia cite McCulloch at length, they never responded to Lopez's cita-
tion of Gibbons. Moreover, while justice Souter cites Gibbons for the proposition that we must
simply trust Congress's wisdom, discretion, and identity with the people, he also never responds
to Lopez's citation of Gibbons. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 648-49 (2000) (Souter,J.,
dissenting).
As Madison wrote, "[the national government's] jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated
objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects." THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 245. As he further ob-
served, "The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and draw-
ing all power into its impetuous vortex.... [I]t is against the enterprising ambition of this de-
partment that the people ought to indulge all theirjealousy and exhaust all their precautions."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 309. Moreover,
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first di-
vided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdi-
vided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 323. As Hamilton added,
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own
powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other de-
partments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is not
to be collected from any particular provisions of the Constitution.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexandar Hamilton), supra note 1, at 467.
Justice Breyer has recently advanced a democratic participatory ideal as a basic feature of his
approach to constitutional interpretation. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5-6 (2005) (describing his approach to interpreting the Con-
stitution). He thus asserts that Lopez and Morrison were wrongly decided because, by enactment
of the GFSZA and VAWA, "the public has participated in the legislative process at the national
level." Id. at 62.
I see three problems with this formulation, particularly in regard to Raich. First, to the ex-
tent that the public participates in the national legislative process, this must be equally true of
all federal laws. Under Breyer's criterion, then, any act of Congress is constitutional. Yet this
renders Article I, Section 8 irrelevant as a source of limits on Congress's power, in turn render-
ing a written Constitution a pointless sham, an implication I have yet to see addressed by Raich
supporters.
Second, Breyer's criterion references only acts of Congress, yet state law contrary to federal
law is a basic feature of Raich. Unlike Lopez and Morrison, that is, Raich involves a direct conflict
between federal and state law, of which Breyer's formulation takes no account. Moreover, the
CUA was mandated by Proposition 215, a citizens' ballot initiative. Since Breyer expressly cham-
pions a democratic participatory ideal in constitutional interpretation, thus, he seems unprinci-
pled in ruling against California voters in Raich.
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Finally, Justice O'Connor argues that the limits on the commerce
power implied by its enumeration are reinforced by the state sover-
eignty principle of the Tenth Amendment.
64
III. RAICHAND THE TWO LOPEZ RULES
A. The First Lopez Rule: Rational Basis/Substantial Effects
In Raich, as noted, the majority holds that the first Lopez rule is sat-
isfied: the Court could find that Congress had a rational basis to
conclude that interstate commerce would be substantially affected if
it failed to criminalize even the private, personal cultivation and use
65of cannabis. This is true even if the use is medicinal and recom-
mended by a licensed physician under an otherwise valid law. Since
Wickard upheld the challenged federal action and Lopez and Morrison
did not, Stevens must argue that Wickard is indistinguishable from
Raich and that Lopez and Morrison are distinguishable from Raich. As
for Lopez and Morrison, Justice Stevens distinguishes these cases from
66Raich as involving facial rather than "as applied" challenges. As for
Wickard, on the other hand, Stevens writes that
[t]he similarities between this case and Wickard are striking. Like the
farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a
fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, inter-
Third, Breyer's failure to account for the structural claims of federalism in Raich is also illu-
minated by THE FEDERALIST No. 39. There, Madison recognized the need to respond to the
Anti-Federalist objection that while the proposed Constitution was adequately republican, it was
not adequately federal. He thus went to great lengths to show that the Constitution had as
much a federal as republican nature. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 1, at
242-46. If the Federalists were this concerned, members of the Raich majority, like Breyer, who
ignore the structural claims of federalism in Raich, seem to take a lopsided view, notwithstand-
ing claims to consider several "basic elements-language, history, tradition, precedent, purpose
and consequence." BREYER, supra note 63, at 8.
64 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment
reinforces limits on the commerce power). Under our system, that is, States alone have a police
power. According to Black's, the police power is "[a]n authority conferred by the American
constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment... upon the individual states, and, in turn,
delegated to local governments, through which they are enabled to ... adopt such laws and
regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud and crime, and secure generally the
comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1041 (5th ed. 1979). As Kreit observes, health policy is traditionally left to the States under the
police power. Kreit, supra note 8, at 1820-21. Since Congress's regulation of the activity in
Raich is an exercise of the police power, Justice Thomas argues that it is not proper under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Raich, 545 U.S. at 59-60 (Thomas,J, dissenting).
In passing, Professor Pushaw treats the Court's emphasis on preventing Congress's interfer-
ence with areas of traditional state concern as a third distinct ruling in Lopez and Morrison. See
Pushaw, supra note 27, at 895 (discussing the Court's focus on protecting areas of traditional
state concern). However, since this consideration functions, like the second Lopez rule, as a
limit on Congress's power, I shall subsume it for our purposes under the second Lopez principle.
65 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 15-22 (applying the first Lopez rule).
66 See id. at 15 (noting the difference in the nature of the challenges among the cases).
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state market. Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was designed "to
control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign com-
merce in order to avoid surpluses..." and consequently control the
market price, a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and
demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug mar-
kets.67
Referencing Wickard, The New Republic opines that Raich is "an Lin-
controversial application of Supreme Court decisions that have been
settled since the New Deal.""P Yet this simply posits two dubious
premises. First, it assumes that reliance on precedent is the sole le-
67 Id. at 18-19 (second alteration in original) (footnote and citation omitted). Justices
O'Connor and Thomas both critique this argument. The majority, they argue, never shows that
the activity at issue in Raich, even in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. As
justice O'Connor writes, the Court reaches its conclusion
without any proof that the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for me-
dicinal purposes, if economic activity in the first place, has a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce .... There is simply no evidence that homegrown medicinal marijuana
users constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to have a discernable, let alone
substantial, impact on the national illicit drug market-or otherwise to threaten the CSA
regime.
Id. at 43, 53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 60-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Stevens's argument).
Justice Stevens replies with a series of descriptive assertions about the CSA, for example, that
it "was a lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework," that "[t]he regula-
tory scheme is designed to foster the beneficial use of those medications," and that it "desig-
nates marijuana as contraband for any purpose." Id. at 24, 27 (majority opinion). Such asser-
tions, however, simply beg the question whether all this well-intended legislative activity exceeds
Congress's constitutional powers. Thus, respondsJustice O'Connor,
something more than mere assertion is required when Congress purports to have power
over local activity whose connection to an intrastate market in not self-evident.... In-
deed, if it were enough in "substantial effects" cases for the Court to supply conceivable
justifications for intrastate regulation related to an interstate market, then we could have
surmised in Lopez that guns in school zones are "never more than an instant from the in-
terstate market" in guns already subject to extensive federal regulation ... and thereby
upheld the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.
Id. at 52 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens replies that the proof the dissents demand is not required, that the principle
of presumptive deference on which the first Lopez rule rests requires only that the Court find
that Congress could rationally conclude that its failure to criminalize the activity in question would,
in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Conceding that Congress
made no specific findings that the activities in Raich substantially affected the interstate canna-
bis market, thus, Stevens simply says that Congress need not do so. Id. at 20 (majority opinion)
(explaining that the Court has never required Congress to make particularized findings in or-
der to legislate, absent a special concern-such as for the protection of free speech). He never
explains, however, why privacy, medical necessity, and the preservation of life do not fall within
this class of "special concerns." In any case, writes Justice O'Connor, "the Court announces a
rule that gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce
Clause-nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory
schemes-rather than with precision." Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority rul-
ing, she concludes, is "nothing more than a drafting guide" for Congress to ensure that it can
pass any law it wishes so long as it relies on the commerce power. Id. at 46.
68 Joint Venture, NEW REPUBLIC, June 20, 2005, at 7. See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637, 644
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had abandoned formalistic commercial distinc-
tions in Commerce Clause cases in the aftermath of the New Deal, as encapsulated in Wickard).
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gitimate mode of constitutional interpretation, but ignores other ba-
sic tools like text, logic, history, and structure. As Professor Pushaw
writes, Lopez and Morrison
built upon the logically unassailable premise that, in our constitutional
system of limited and enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause cannot
be interpreted in a way that effectively leaves Congress with absolute dis-
cretion. Furthermore, the Court usefully redirected its attention to the
pertinent constitutional language, which speaks of "commerce" that oc-
curs "among the several States."
... [T]he Constitution grants the federal government enumerated
powers because the Framers feared totally centralized authority, and the
Supreme Court accordingly has an obligation to enforce the limitations
set forth in Article 1.
6 9
Second, even putting this problem aside and assuming that
precedent is the only legitimate source of constitutional interpreta-
tion, The New Republic also implicitly assumes that the only relevant
precedents are New Deal rulings like Wickard, rather than older ones
like Gibbons or newer ones like Lopez and Morrison. Indeed, Justice
Stevens writes that "none of our Commerce Clause cases can be
viewed in isolation, 70 yet that is exactly what he does by focusing ex-
clusively on Wickard. When the limits on Congress's commerce
power, reinforced by Gibbons, Lopez and Morrison, are factored into




Pushaw, supra note 27, at 894, 912 (footnote omitted). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding."); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26, 108, 120 (2000) (analyzing the concept of enumerated powers
with respect to women's rights and religion). We are interpreting a charter of government, a
basic structural feature of which is the division of power that is federalism. If the word "Com-
merce" in Article I, Section 8 can be construed to have unlimited meaning, then it appears that
"written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own
nature illimitable." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Even assuming
that the private adult possession and medicinal use of cannabis is "Commerce" within the mean-
ing of Article I, Section 8, Diane Monson's activity should still have been unreachable under the
Commerce Clause because, even if it is commerce, it is in no fair sense interstate commerce.
The activity criminalized by federal law took place completely in her home. Particularly if a
plant is in the ground rather than in a container, its possession is as non-interstate as an activity
can be.
70 Raich, 545 U.S. at 15.
71 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at
44, for more background and a discussion of the "Constitution in Exile" debate. The term
"Constitution in Exile" (CIE) is attributed to Douglas Ginsberg, a federal appellate judge. This
is the same Judge Ginsberg, it must be noted, whose nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court by
President Reagan immediately following the Robert Bork debacle was derailed when it came to
light that he had smoked marijuana as a Harvard law professor. Linda Greenhouse, Hearings to
Begin for Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1987, at Al.
By "Constitution in Exile," writes Rosen, "Ginsberg meant to identify legal doctrines that es-
tablished firm limitations on state and federal power before the New Deal." Rosen, supra, at 44.
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Beyond this, there is a flaw in the majority opinion that neither
the dissents nor the Lewis and Clark Law Review Symposium addresses
directly. Stevens acknowledges that in Wickard, the AAA sought to
protect and stabilize an interstate market while in Raich, the CSA
seeks to destroy an interstate market.7 2 The laws by which Congress
sought to reach the two activities thus have-very different functions,73
yet Stevens claims that this is of "no constitutional import., 74 After
all, we saw in his reference to Wickard that he lumps the two laws to-
gether by referring to Congress's interest in controlling the supply and
demand of wheat. ' Yet such a position is untenable, for unless the
rational basis/substantial effects test is to be without effect, whether
Congress has a rational basis to criminalize an activity depends on the
goal it seeks to attain. Some means are irrational given certain ends.
If Congress's goal is to destroy a market, then, there is simply no ra-
tional basis to undermine a state law that functions to diminish that
76
market, since the state law advances Congress's ends.
Indeed, Justice Stevens seemed to recognize this at oral argument.
As he said to the Solicitor General in reference to Monson's cannabis
Among those associated with the concept of CIE is Justice Thomas, who wrote in Lopez that,
"[i]f anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a century
and a half of precedent." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). Reinforcing this view in Raich, Thomas asserts that the substantial effects prong of the
Lopez test is so rootless and malleable as to be illegitimate. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 67 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the substantial effects requirement); see also William W. Van Alstyne, The
Constitution in Exile: Is It Time to Bring It in from the Cold?, 51 DuKE L.J. 1, 25-26 (2001) (discuss-
ing how the origin of the CIE concept came from ChieftJustice Marshall).
72 Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 n.29 (noting that the CSA is seeking to eradicate the interstate mari-
juana market).
73 In Rehnquist's words,
Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that possession of a
gun in a school zone does not.... [T] he Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938... was de-
signed to regulate the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce in
order to avoid surpluses and shortages ....
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. Kreit observes that "the CSA does not seek to control the price of mari-
juana but rather to prevent its interstate distribution entirely." Kreit, supra note 8, at 1824.
Gouldin adds that the "analogy between growing marijuana for personal use and the cultivation
of wheat for household use ... ignores the critical differences between effects on a legitimate
market and on a black market." See Gouldin, supra note 8, at 514. Morrison, we saw, reaffirmed
the distinction between economic and criminal activity. See Newbern, supra note 8, at 1620.
74 Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 n.29.
7. Id. at 15 (discussing that the purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of
controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets). Similarly, Justice Souter's
claim that the Court must defer where Congress has a rational basis to think that a law protects
commerce, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 641 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting), is
irrelevant where, as with the CSA, Congress clearly seeks not to protect but to destroy a market.
76 Likewise, Justice Scalia writes that "the unregulated production of wheat for personal con-
sumption diminished demand in the regulated wheat market." Raich, 545 U.S. at 37, n.2
(ScaliaJ., concurring in judgment). This illustrates my point: Where Congress simply seeks to
protect and stabilize an interstate market, it has a rational basis in countering diminished de-
mand in that market. Where it seeks to destroy such a market, it does not.
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plants, "this marijuana won't get into interstate commerce. In fact it
would reduce the demand for marijuana, because it would supply these
local users and they wouldn't have to go into the interstate market."
7
1
In his opinion, however, Justice Stevens suggests that the CUA does
just the opposite. As he writes,
Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between
marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, and con-
cerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty conclud-
ing that Congress has a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate
the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a
gaping hole in the CSA. 8
So, why the change of heart? How can Justice Stevens shift from
the assumption that the CUA reduces demand to the assertion that it
increases supply? Quite easily, it seems: he simply defers to Con-
gress's assumption, which thinks the best about those within the belt-
way and the worst about those outside the beltway. When it comes to
cannabis policy, that is, Congress and the Federal Drug Administra-
tion alone are trustworthy, while doctors, patients, caregivers, and law
enforcement officials in states with medicinal cannabis laws are cor-
rupt.' 9 Unlike the dissenters, who note that the Court usually as-
80sumes that states enforce their own laws, Justice Stevens simply ac-
cepts that Congress could rationally conclude that states would not
properly regulate marijuana under their own laws."' Justice
O'Connor concedes that, while unsubstantiated, such an assumption
77 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2845980
(emphasis added).
78 Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (footnote and citation omitted). As he adds elsewhere, "The exemp-
tion for cultivation by patients and caregivers can only increase the supply of marijuana in the
California market." Id. at 31.
79 See generally id. at 19, 30-31 (discussing California's inability to police the illegal marijuana
market and thus its inability to keep the effect of medicianal cultivation of marijuana within the
State).
See id. at 57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting thatJames Madison wrote that the Consti-
tution reserves "to the several States" powers which, "in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State"); id. at 63 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that there is no evidence that
California's control over the intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana is insufficient).
81 Justice Stevens suggests that if Congress does not regulate such substances, as it has with
the CSA, the States will legalize the private possession and use of cocaine, LSD, and heroin. Id.
at 28. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has written elsewhere, however, "the extreme examples are
seldom the ones that arise in the real world of constitutional litigation." Bd. of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 907 (1982) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Relatedly, The New Republic refers to
those who oppose Raich as "antiregulatory,"JOINT VENTURE, supra note 68, at 7, yet this is just a
misleading label. Simply because one thinks a policy domain should be left to the states does
not establish that he or she is "antiregulatory." It may simply be that, under the federal system
created by the Constitution, the person believes that regulation of police power concerns, like
public health, should presumptively be left to the states.
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is not implausible in all cases.82 Justice Stevens, however, had shown
respect at oral argument for "the independent judgment of the phy-
sicians who prescribe it for the patients at issue in this case." s He
thus seems inconsistent and arbitrary on this basic point.
Yet let us give Justice Stevens his due. After all, he at least recog-
nizes that he must speak to this issue. If the constitutional law in this
area really is that Congress need only be able to conclude rationally
that its failure to criminalize a given activity will substantially "affect"
or "impact" interstate commerce, that is, regardless of whether that "im-
pact" is an increase or a decrease in the volume of that commerce, then Con-
gress's power is simply unlimited. Justice Stevens knows that this is
untenable, however, for reasons we have seen. He thus recognizes
that he must assert that Congress could rationally conclude that the
CUA increases the supply of marijuana in interstate commerce. That
would presumably be a rational basis for Congress to criminalize the
activity in question. It is just unfortunate that the Court finds that it
must defer to Congress's assumption that only organs of the national
government, like Congress and the Federal Drug Administration
(FDA), are wise and trustworthy, while all those outside the beltway
are misguided and inclined to crime. Even so staunch a Federalist as
Justice Marshall, we saw, had a more balanced view than this.
Again, however, let us give Justice Stevens his due. For one thing,
he can say that his suggestion at oral argument, that the CUA reduces
demand in the interstate cannabis market, did not reflect his real
views. He advanced it, that is, simply to test the lawyers arguing the
case in order to derive better guidance from them. Moreover, even if
he truly believed at oral argument that the CUA functions overall to
reduce cannabis demand, and that the independent judgment of
physicians (outside the FDA) could be trusted, he can always claim
that added reflection on the matter led him to a different conclusion.
Even beyond this, Stevens's broader view seems clear. As our na-
tional- legislature, Congress is where an issue of national proportion
like cannabis policy should be resolved in the first instance if possi-
ble. 4 The basic problem, after all, is a federal statute-the CSA-
specifically its classification of marijuana under Schedule I. The dis-
pute in Raich would dissolve if Congress simply rescheduled cannabis
as a Schedule II substance, thus allowing states to legalize it for me-
dicinal use, subject to a doctor's recommendation. Alternatively, Ste-
82 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 55-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the regulations the
State of California has put into place to regulate the use and cultivation of medicinal marijuana
in the State).
83 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 19.
84 In one scholar's words, "If one wants a centralized decisionmaker to be in a position to
make policyjudgments, it will have to be Congress." Ann Althouse, Why Not Heighten the Scrutiny
of Congressional Power when the States Undertake Policy Experiments?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 779,
788 (2005).
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vens could note, Congress can vote to block enforcement of federal
law where it conflicts with state medicinal cannabis laws. 5 Thus, he
can say this should all be worked out by the political resources avail-
able, withoutjudicial intervention. -
One objection may be that Congress has long been intransigent
on this issue, dominated by a religious mindsets6 that has been exac-
erbated by the "reefer madness" propaganda of the 1930's.87 Yet Ste-
vens can reply that precisely due to the Raich litigation, the issue of
medicinal cannabis reform now has unprecedented political and le-
gal visibility and momentum. If Congress has been unresponsive un-
til now, he can say, the Court's ruling in Raich has created an open-
ing, an opportunity for appropriate reform."" Ultimately, then, it is
difficult to fault Stevens's judgment that Congress is the forum to
which medical cannabis reformers should apply, and that the Court
had to rule for Congress by any means necessary. While I shall argue
that "difficult" does not mean "impossible," we must nonetheless give
Justice Stevens his due.
B. The Second Lopez Rule: Possession Is Not Commerce
I have labeled the rule that possession alone is not "Commerce"
the second Lopez rule. While Justice Stevens never formally invali-
While it may be objected that Congress has consistently declined to do this,Justice Stevens
could observe that this proposal gains more votes in Congress every year. In 2003, for example,
the States' Rights to Medical Marijuana Act had the support of 152 members of the House. See
Congressional Votes for NYF"AK the Week of 7/18-7/25/2003, STS. NEWS SERVICEJuly 25, 2003 (not-
ing that the House, by a vote of 152 to 273, rejected an amendment to an appropriations act
that would have prohibited the government from trying to override state laws that allow the
medicinal use of marijuana). In 2006, however, such a proposal had the support of 163 mem-
bers. See Last Week in Congress/How Our Representatives Voted, BUFFALO NEWS, July 2, 2006, at A8
(stating that the House, by a vote of 163 to 259, rejected an amendment to the appropriations
bill that would have prohibited the use of the funds to enforce federal laws on marijuana where
states had passed a law allowing the use of marijuana for medical reasons). Further, now that
Raich has directed reformers to the federal government, Professor Craker seems to have some
leverage in his bid to conduct a study of the medicinal properties of cannabis. See Hearings Be-
gin Today in ACLU Challenge to Court Obstruction of Medical Marijuana Research (Aug. 22,
2005), http://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/medmarijuana/20166prs20050822.html; see also Marc
Kaufman, Federal Marijuana Monopoly Challenged: Researchers Want to Grow More Plants and Find
More Medicinal Uses, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2005, at A2 (noting that Professor Craker at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts will argue before the Drug Enforcement Administration for a license to
grow the research drugs).
96 See SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON 158-
64 (2005) (describing the influence of religion).
87 See generally GERBER, supra note 8, chs. 1-3 (describing marijuana's status during the
1930's); SLOMAN, supra note 25, at 29-83 (noting the reefer madness propaganda of the
1930's).
88 Two scholars suggest that Raich may have a reforming impact--on the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. See generally Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Clear the Air: Gonzales v. Raich,
the "Comprehensive Scheme"Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENrrL.
L. 491 (2005).
[Vol. 9:5
Sept. 2007] WAR ONDRUGS: CONGRESS'S TYRANNYAND IRRELEVANCE 1151
dates this rule in Raich, Merrill observes that it "was watered down to
the point where it may have little continuing significance. " ' When a
judge does this, however, he justifies later courts in doing the same to
his rulings unless he can persuade those courts that he had a princi-
pled basis for avoiding controlling precedent. I submit that Stevens's
failure to carry this burden of persuasion is evident in three ways.
First, he never overcomes the gravitational force of Lopez and Morri-
son. Second, his ruling rests on an indefensibly broad definition of
"economic activity," one he never even has to use, given the cases he
cites and the concerns expressed by the prominent editorial pages
that praised Raich. Third, he tries to derive "ought" from "is" by sug-
gesting that since Congress criminalizes mere possession of other
items, the Court is not bound to observe the second Lopez rule. I
submit that his position is weak on all three grounds, and that his rul-
ing should be overturned at the first opportunity. Let us take these
grounds one at a time.
1. The Gravitational Force of Lopez and Morrison9 °
In Lopez, we saw how the GFSZA criminalized mere possession of a
class of objects, much as the CSA does in Raich. The subject matter in
Raich, however, is far less dangerous than that in Lopez. While no one
has ever died from consuming cannabis,9 ' that is, thousands are killed
or wounded each year by guns. If the Commerce Clause bars federal
power to criminalize public possession of firearms, then, it must also
bar federal power to criminalize merely private possession of canna-
bis for personal medicinal use. The Court should thus have upheld
the Ninth Circuit based on fidelity to Lopez alone.2
Unlike the GFSZA, which criminalized mere possession of a class
of objects, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) criminalized
gender-motivated violence. Like Lopez, however, Morrison recognized
that the Commerce Clause limits Congress's power to criminalize
even what all agree to be a serious threat to human safety. Thus, if
89 Merrill, supra note 42, at 826; see also Adler, supra note24, at 753 (arguing that Raich repre-
sents a repudiation of Morrison and Lopez).
90 Dworkin speaks of precedent's "gravitational force," and "the fairness of treating like cases
alike." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977). As Rawls adds, "the rule of
law... implies the precept that similar cases be treated similarly." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 237 (1971).
91 See THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 101-02 (James A. Inciardi ed. 1999) (containing an
article by Professor Grinspoon of Harvard stating that "despite its use by millions of people over
thousands of years cannabis has never caused a death").
92 Fairly applied, in fact, the second Lopez rule would have stopped application of the first
Lopez rule in its tracks, for it establishes a threshold inquiry: is the activity being regulated,
rather than its effects, economic (or more faithfully to the text, commerce)? If not, there is
nothing to aggregate, for even a billion times zero is zero. The aggregation principle is thus
inapplicable, and provides no support for a ruling for Congress.
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the violent, malum in se activity criminalized by the VAWA is beyond
Congress's regulatory power, then the peaceful, private, medicinal,
merely malum prohibitum activity criminalized by the CSA must be as
well. Even applying a rational basis test to federal action, as the ma-
jority claims to do, Justice Stevens never adequately responds to these
basic features of the relevant case law terrain. A fair application of
Morrison, especially in light of Lopez, should have led the Raich Court
to uphold the Ninth Circuit's decision.
This conclusion is reinforced, moreover, by two further considera-
tions. First, if Congress may not even compliment or duplicate the
exercise of state police power where the subject matter or activity in
question is beyond the commerce power, then it may certainly not
undermine it, as the CSA does to the CUA. Second, in the recent
Senate confirmation hearings for Justices Roberts and Alito, Judiciary
Committee Democrats asserted that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey 
9 deepened and strengthened Roe's legitimacy,
while denying that Morrison had the same effect on Lopez. 95  This
seems arbitrary, 96 and so again, fairly applied, Lopez, as reinforced by
Morrison, should have compelled the Court to uphold the Ninth Cir-
cuit.
2. An Illegitimate, Unnecessarily Broad Definition of "Commerce"
Justice Stevens's next failure regarding the second Lopez rule is
evident in his adoption of "a capacious definition of 'economics'
found in a forty-year old dictionary."97 As he writes, "'Economics' re-
fers to 'the production, distribution, and consumption of commodi-
ties.' 98 Since Monson was "producing" and consuming a "commod-
ity" by this definition, she was engaged in "economic" activity that, in
the aggregate, can be criminalized under Congress's commerce
power. As Justice Breyer has written, after all, "virtually every kind of
activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its
93 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
94 See Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to be an AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 109th Cong. 145, 150-55 (2006) (statement of Sen. Feinstein, Member, Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary) (asking then-Judge Alito if he thought there was any special justification that
might override Casey's confirmation of the soundness of Roe).
95 See Adler, supra note 24, at 761 (discussing the denial of Morrison's impact on Lopez).
96 The assertion that Raich limited Lopez and Morrison to their facts, while perhaps accurate
for the time being, will do little to convince Justices Roberts and Alito that it should remain so if
they do not already agree. See Merrill, supra note 42, at 844 (describing the limitations imposed
by Raich).
97 Pushaw, supra note 27, at 898.
98 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005) (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
1152 [Vol. 9:5
Sept. 2007] WAR ON DRUGS: CONGRESS'S TYRANNYAND IRRELEVANCE 1153
conditions, outside the State-at least when considered in the aggre-
gate."':'
In an abstract, philosophical sense, it may be that all human activ-
ity is "economic.""' As Professor Pushaw notes, however, the Court in
Lopez and Morrison "mistakenly used 'commerce' and 'economics' in-
terchangeably, instead of recognizing that the former is a subset of
the latter.""" Even putting this aside and assuming that the two terms
can be used as synonyms, the dissents argue that Stevens's definition
is out of place in Commerce Clause interpretation."2 There must be
9 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100 As an analogy in free speech law, one could say that in a broad, philosophical sense all
human expression is "political." Since political speech is among the most highly protected
forms of expression under the First Amendment, even obscenity, defamation, or fighting words
would be presumptively protected as political speech, which cuts deeply against the thrust of
First Amendment jurisprudence.
101 Pushaw, supra note 27, 895 (citations omitted). He continues:
"Commerce" means selling property or services in the marketplace, as well as prepara-
tory activities for that purpose. By contrast, "economics" is an umbrella term that covers
anything-commercial or not-that relates to the production, distribution, or use of
goods or services. For instance, rape and gun possession near schools have "economic"
impacts, but they are not "commerce."
Id. (citations omitted). See also id. at 913 (noting that, by its terms, the Commerce Clause does
not empower Congress to regulate economic activity that is not also commercial activity).
102 As Justice O'Connor writes,
The Court's definition of economic activity is breathtaking.... [It] threatens to sweep all
of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach.
The Court uses a dictionary definition of economics to skirt the real problem of
drawing a meaningful line between "what is national and what is local." It will not do to
say that Congress may regulate noncommercial activity simply because it may have an ef-
fect of the demand for commercial goods, or because the noncommercial endeavor can,
in some sense, substitute for commercial activity. Most commercial goods or services
have some sort of privately producible analogue. Home care substitutes for daycare.
Charades games substitute for movie tickets. Backyard or windowsill gardening substi-
tutes for going to the supermarket. To draw the line wherever private activity affects the
demand for market goods is to draw no line at all, and to declare everything economic.
We have already rejected the result that would follow-a federal police power.
... [Even] Wickard did not hold or imply that small-scale production of commodi-
ties is always economic, and automatically within Congress's reach.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 49-51 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
As Thomas adds,
the majority defines economic activity in the broadest possible terms .... This carves out
a vast swath of activities that are subject to federal regulation. If the majority is to be
taken seriously, the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives,
and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States.... One searches the Court's opinion in
vain for any hint of what aspect of American life is reserved to the States.
Id., at 69-70 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Speaking of potluck suppers, it seems that Congress could, under the Court's definition, eas-
ily criminalize the consumption of certain foods, e.g., all manner of "fast food," on grounds that
it is not good for us. As with guns and alcohol, hundreds of thousands of people die every year
from obesity-related ailments, while no one has ever died from consuming cannabis. That
Congress will never do so because the fast food lobby is as powerful as the tobacco and alcohol
lobbies is beside the point.
As Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, has observed, "In a sense any conduct in
this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we
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a workable clear line between commerce and non-commerce, they
argue, since otherwise the Commerce Clause has been rendered de-
void of meaning. Stevens's hyperexpansive definition of "econom-
ics," for purposes of interpreting "Commerce" in Article I, Section 8,
is thus simply illegitimate where that clause was clearlX meant, and in-
terpreted by Marshall, to limit as well as grant power.
Had Stevens really wanted a definition of "economics" for pur-
poses of a legitimate interpretation of the Commerce Clause, I sub-
mit that he would have consulted at least one more authority, like Ro-
get's Thesaurus. Unlike Webster's, Roget's supplies a range of synonyms
for a given word, thus providing a fuller, more accurate picture of the
word's meaning than that obtained in a short, abstract definition.
With respect to the word "economy," it provides the following:
"Verbs 849.7-8: economize, save, scrimp, skimp, scrape and save,
keep within one's means or budget, retrench, cut down, cut down
expenses, cut corners, cut back;
Adjectives 849.9: economical, thrifty, frugal, unwasteful, prudent,
provident, saving, economizing, spare, sparing, scrimping, skimp-
ing." 104
By these lights, "economic" activity could fairly be defined as that
activity performed with a primary motive either to maximize one's
chances of financial/material gain or to minimize one's chances of
financial/material loss. This covers a range of activity, yet it also es-
tablishes a coherent limit on the meaning of the word "economic."
Activities related to sex and guns provide several illustrations. While
marital sex would not be economic activity under the Roget's defini-
tion, prostitution would be.105 Similarly, while merely possessing a
gun or pornography0 6 would not be economic activity under the Ro-
have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
580 (1995) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
103 See supra note 62 (discussing the two principles of Marshall's legacy in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which is to limit as well as grant congressional power). Thus, "While recognizing
that the most expansive uses of the commerce power should be confined to economic activities,
the majority so expanded the definition of 'economic' so as to leave this a meaningless qualifi-
cation." Adler, supra note 24, at 762. As Merrill adds, "With respect to the innovation limiting
the substantial effects test to economic activity, the [Raich] majority did not deny that such a
restriction had been imposed by Lopez and Morrison. But it largely drained the innovation of
any significance, by defining 'economic' in sweepingly broad terms[.]" Merrill, supra note 42,
at 844.
104 ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS (3d ed. 1962) §§ 849.7-9.
0 Stephen Barnett suggested this distinction at oral argument. TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL
ARGUMENT, supra note 77, at 49. One can only hope that all agree that prostitution is economic
activity in a way that marital sex (at least sometimes) is not.
1o6 See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a federal
statute prohibiting possession of child pornography made with materials that traveled in inter-
state commerce was unconstitutional as applied to private family photographs depicting a
woman and her young daughter with exposed genitals).
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get's definition, 0 7 buying, selling, or brandishing a gun in a robbery
would be. Physical violence would not be economic activity under
the Roget's definition unless done for purposes of robbery or extor-
tion.108
In general, much solitary activity, especially in one's home, would
be non-economic by the Roget's-derived definition. If I play my guitar,
practice T'ai Chi Chuan, read a poem, take an aspirin, or consume
cannabis in the privacy of my home, I do so simply to feel better, not
for financial reasons. While states could regulate or prohibit some of
these actions under their police power, none would be economic ac-
tivities under the Roget's-based definition,0° and thus regulable under
Congress's commerce power. Had Stevens sought out and fairly ap-
plied the definition of "economics" derivable from a relevant author-
ity like Roget's, he could never have ruled as he did. His ruling thus
appears blatantly result-oriented and should be overruled.
3. Case Law/Editorial Authority: Civil Rights, Labor, and Environmental
Protection
As we turn to the case law that Stevens cites, a tragic irony
emerges: the Roget's definition shows that he did not even need the
broad definition he adopted in order to secure Congress's regulatory
power in the policy areas in which he and prominent editorial pages
expressed concern; reliance on the Roget's definition would have suf-
ficed. Justice Stevens cites the coal mining pollution case of Hodel v.
17 Though it may be argued that, even where mere possession is involved, "Congress can
establish reasonable presumptions that the production or possession of a certain significant
quantity of goods indicates an intent to sell them." Pushaw, supra note 27, at 909.
108 Further, although Stevens tries to lump them all together, "manufacturing" and "produc-
tion" denote far more than mere possession. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22, 25-26 (2005).
9 Justice O'Connor suggests that one of the "objective markers" available to separate the
activity involved in this case from that properly regulable under the Commerce Clause is that
the CUA only legalizes the medicinal use of cannabis (under a licensed physician's supervision)
and not its recreational use. Raich, 545 U.S. at 48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing regu-
lable activity under the Commerce Clause). While Justice O'Connor's opinion should have
controlled in Raich, she is incorrect on this point, and even Professor Pushaw overlooks this dis-
tinction. See Pushaw, supra note 27, at 910 (conceding that private non-medical use of mari-
juana in the home is subject to government regulation). From a Commerce Clause perspective,
that is, medicinal and recreational uses are identical insofar as the activity itself-consumption
of cannabis-is the same regardless of the purpose for which it is consumed. Justice Stevens is
thus correct that both medicinal and recreational use are on the same side of the boundary be-
tween what Congress can and cannot reach under its commerce power. See Raich, 545 U.S. at
25-29 (discussing activities Congress can reach). He is wrong, however, about which side of the
line they are both on. Mere possession and consumption of small amounts of cannabis,
whether for medicinal or recreational purposes, are not economic activities. They involve nei-
ther a transaction in which something of value changes hands nor an activity performed for fi-
nancial profit or to avoid financial loss.
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Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,110 for example, as well as
the civil rights cases of Katzenbach v. McClung"1 and Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States."2 As for the editorial pages, The Washington Post
wrote that "[a] Supreme Court decision disallowing federal authority
in [the area of federal drug control] would have been a disaster in
areas ranging from civil rights enforcement to environmental protec-
tion." 
113
In response to Monson and Raich's position, The Washington Post
continued, "consider its implications. Can Congress protect an en-
dangered species that exists only in a single state and may be wiped
out by some noncommercial activity? Can it force an employer who
operates only locally to accommodate the disabled?"14 In its praise of
Raich, similarly, The New York Times announced that "we take very se-
riously the Court's concern about protecting the Commerce Clause,
the vital constitutional principle that has allowed the federal govern-
ment to thwart evils like child labor and segregation."1 15 Deriding, the
Raich dissents, The New York Times continued, "These conservatives
want to turn the clock back to before the New Deal, when workers
I10 452 U.S. 264, 305 (1981) (upholding the federal Surface Mining and Reclamation Act in
the face of a Commerce Clause challenge).
11 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
against local restaurants on the grounds that a substantial portion of the food served moved in
interstate commerce).
112 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (holding that the interstate movement of persons constitutes
commerce). In McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court upheld Congress's commerce
power to enforce Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations. Justice Stevens also cites Perez v. United States, a case involving a statute that
criminalized loansharking, i.e., "extortionate credit transactions," which is clearly commercial
activity. 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971). He also cites Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903),
yet this involved lottery tickets which, unlike cannabis, have no medicinal value. Indeed, they
are not even consumed, like alcohol and cigarettes, and thus have only exchange value, i.e.,
they are necessarily only articles of commerce. Finally, it was undisputed in Champion that the
tickets had moved interstate, so this case is not remotely analogous to the facts in Raich.
13 Editorial, Not About Pot, WASH. POST, June 8, 2005, at A20. Similarly, Representative
Charles Gonzales recently testified during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the
nomination of Justice Alito that future rulings by the Supreme Court that followed Alito's dis-
sent in United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286-94 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting), would
prevent Congress from protecting "civil rights." Judiciary Committee Hearings on the Nomination of
Samuel Alito for the Supreme Court (C-SPAN television broadcastJan. 16, 2006). I shall return to a
discussion ofJustice Alito's ruling in Rybar, see infra note 149.
114 Not About Pot, supra note 113, at A20. See also Pia Lopez, Thomas's Disturbing Views in Dissent
to Pot Ruling, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 10, 2005, at B7 (claiming that for Justice Thomas, laws
regulating working conditions and hours and environmental laws should be gone). In response
to President Bush's nomination of John Roberts to the Supreme Court, the Alliance for Justice
says Robert's dissent in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003), could "undermine
a wide swath of federal protections, including many environmental, civil rights, workplace, and
criminal laws." Ronald Brownstein, Oppenents of Nominee Taking Populist Tack: Critics ofJohn Rob-
ertsJr. for High Court Justice Are Talking Economics, Not Abortion Rights, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at
A13.
115 Editorial, The Court and Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES,June 8, 2005, at A18.
1156 [Vol. 9:5
Sept. 2007] WAR ON DRUGS: CONGRESS'S TYRANNY AND IRREL -EVANCE
were exploited, factories polluted at will and the elderly faced inse-
cure retirements.""'
Justice Stevens's precedents and the editorials identify three key
policy areas in which Congress's power to regulate would allegedly be
jeopardized had the Court ruled for Monson and Raich: civil rights,
labor, and environmental protection. Since a Roget's-based defini-
tion of economics would encompass all three spheres of activity, how-
ever, the Court's sweeping definition was unneeded to secure Con-
gress's power to regulate in these areas.117
As for civil rights, the activity targeted by Title II occurs within the
context of requests for commercial transactions: a potential cus-
tomer seeks to rent a room in a hotel or. purchase a meal in a restau-
rant, and this offer is rejected solely based on his race. Such dis-
crimination is bound up with economic activity under the Roget's
definition, and is thus "Commerce" for Article I, Section 8 purposes.
Neither Justice Stevens's citation of Heart of Atlanta Motel and
McClung, nor the editorial pages' insistence that Congress has power
to enforce "civil rights," therefore,justifies the ruling in Raich.
16 Id. See also Bruce Fein, Difficult Case, Right Decision, WASH. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A15
(criticizing Justice Thomas's position as extreme); Joint Venture, supra note 68, at 7 ("An unusual
coalition of three justices-Sandra Day O'Connor, William Rehnquist, and Clarence Thomas-
dissented from the ruling, suggesting that anti-regulatory forces on the Court remain strong.").
But see Editorial, Unconstitutional Cannabis, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at B12 (praising Justice
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist for intellectual integrity and blaming Congress for the re-
sult). As for The New York Times's reference to elderly insecure retirements, this seems a red
herring: Congress is not really regulating interstate commerce here; rather, it is providing for
the general welfare through its spending and taxing powers. Some legal scholarship suggests
that Lopez and Morrison wrongly recognize limits on Congress's commerce power because they
would lead to the gutting of civil rights and environmental legislation. Erwin Chemerinsky, Pro-
gressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55-59 (2004); Susan N. Herman, David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium:
Our New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1201, 1205-06 (2004); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on De-
mocracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 376, 382 (2002).
17 Pushaw echoes this point when he argues that his Net-Federalist methodology "identifies
clear rules of law that are rooted in the Commerce Clause's text and history, yet can be applied
without dismantling the modern federal regulatory framework." Pushaw, supra note 27, at 884.It8
Part of the problem may be that liberals are "haunted by the ghost of Jim Crow." Ryan
Grim, A Guide to Gonzales vs. Raich: What the Medical Marijuana Ruling Means for Patients, the
Commerce Clause, Marital Sex, Antonin Scalia's Career and More, SALON.COM, June 7, 2005,
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/06/07/supremecourt-and_pot/ in-
dex.html. The assumption appears to be that since Congress got it right and the states got it
wrong on racial discrimination in 1964, federal law is, by definition, always right and state law,
by definition, is always wrong anytime they conflict. Given the trend of the states and of other
western liberal democracies on cannabis, however, this is not obviously correct. In any case, it is
not a premise of American Federalism.
Beyond this, two points are in order on the subject of civil rights. First, it is doubtful that
Congress is really concerned about civil rights enforcement. If it were, I submit that it would
respond in one of two ways to Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which allows the use of
substantial racial preferences in the competition for scarce, valuable public resources by gov-
ernmental institutions accepting federal funds, notwithstanding Title VI's express command of
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As for labor, the editorial pages cite legitimate concerns about the
exploitation of children and the accommodation of the disabled. 1 9
Again, however, the activity targeted when Congress regulates the
conditions of labor is economic activity under the Roget's definition.
It involves the compensated provision of services in which employer
and employee both have financial motives.12 Especially given the
special protections for children throughout American law, child labor
is well within Congress's regulatory authority, particularly where chil-
dren are used for pornography.
As for environmental protection, finally, Professor Merrill ob-
serves that "[m]odern federal environmental legislation ... enjoys
widespread popular and political support, and is largely based on the
commerce power."'12' Environmental legislation, in contrast to the
CSA as applied in Raich, is plausibly based on that power. In Hodel,
for example, Congress sought through the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act12 2 to limit pollution and protect wildlife habitats.
Since such mining activities are plainly motivated by financial profit,
they can fairly be classified as economic activity under the Roget's-
based definition. 1
2 3
Even beyond the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8 arguably
provides an independent source of congressional authority to enact
federal environmental protection law: the "common Defence and
racial nondiscrimination. It would either reverse Grutter with respect to Title VI, or repeal Title
VI's racial nondiscrimination rule as bad policy in light of Grutter.
Second, Congress's authority to enact and enforce racial nondiscrimination is distinct from
the power to criminalize the private possession and medicinal use of cannabis. Beyond the fact
that, unlike the CSA and the CUA, federal and state nondiscrimination laws no longer flatly
conflict, as they have in the past, reasonable experts can disagree on the medicinal merits of
cannabis and the very limited question of whether it should be rescheduled under the CSA. By
contrast, all reasonable people agree that race is no basis on which to judge people. Unlike
medicinal cannabis, there is no serious scientific disagreement about whether race determines
intelligence, character, or humanity, and thus there is no scientific disagreement about whether
one merits the protection of nondiscrimination law. Jim Crow laws were based on nothing but
racial animosity, while medicinal cannabis laws (like the CUA) are based on compassion and
the professional judgment of licensed physicians.
19 American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,111 (8)-(9) (2006).
120 The propriety of requiring reasonable accommodations by employers, enabling the dis-
abled, where possible, to work to make a living, is clear. It is thus difficult to see why it is not
also sufficiently important to accommodate the sick and dying who seek, in order to preserve
their lives, to consume privately what their doctors consider medicine, especially when no one,
including the employer, is burdened by that activity.
121 Merrill, supra note 42, at 842.
122 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2006).
123 As for Congress's assertion of authority over "navigable waters" in statutes like the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006), the Court has suggested that it seemed to be invoking its
power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, such that reliance on the substantial
effects prong of Lopez and Morrison was not needed. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168 n.3 (2001) (avoiding reliance on the substantial
effects test).
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general Welfare" Clause. 24 This provision is often cited as a mere ex-
tension of the Spending Clause,15 but two things must be noted.
First, it was not so treated by Hamilton, whose vision of power being
centralized in the national government is matched, if not exceeded,
by that of the Raich majority." Second, the ecosystem is our home,
and the quality-indeed, the very possibility-of our lives requires its
defense.' Laws aimed at protecting it are thus an exercise of the
power to provide for "the common Defence."
28
I conclude that neither the cases cited by Justice Stevens nor the
concerns expressed in the editorial pages show that Congress must
have power to imprison the likes of Diane Monson and Angel Raich
in order to regulate civil rights, labor, and environmental protection.
The activities targeted by such laws are not mere possession but are
also economic activities under the Roget's-derived definition, and
they are thus properly reachable under the commerce power and ar-
guably under other Article I, Section 8 powers as well.
124 This clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the Unites States .... U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. I (emphasis added). The Preamble, of course,
also notes that one of the reasons for the Constitution is to "provide for the common Defence
[and] promote the general Welfare," yet unlike the clause in Article I, Section 8, the Preamble
is not an affirmative grant of power. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
125 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2005) (imposing the "general wel-
fare" clause as a limitation on the spending power); Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d
324, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing all of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 as the source of the
spending power); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2575
(2005) (describing the "common defence" language as a source for the "superior capacity" the-
ory of the federal spending power). This practice has a solid pedigree, as Madison notes that
the phrase was transplanted into Article I, Section 8 from the Eighth Article of Confederation,
where it clearly had reference to the payment of debts "incurred for the common defence & general
welfare." See Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 17, 1830), in FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 55, at 483-87.
126 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 26 (advocating
for a strong national government); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President's
Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article , Section 8, Clause
I of the United States Constitution, 33J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 103 (1999) (discussing the "strong"
Hamiltonian interpretation of an independent grant of power in the General Welfare Clause).
127 Indeed, federal law provides that the purposes of the National Environmental Protection
Act are, in part, "[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; [and] to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man ... ." National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
128 By contrast, it is doubtful that Hamilton would have considered sick patients like Monson
and Raich growing and consuming a plant tor medicinal purposes in private a threat to "the
common Defence." As Justice Thomas writes, "The majority's rewriting of the Commerce
Clause seems to be rooted in the belief that, unless the Commerce Clause covers the entire web
of human activity, Congress will be left powerless to regulate the national economy effectively."
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 70 (2005) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
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4. "The Second Lopez Rule Is Not Really the Law." Statutory Authority:
Nuclear/Biological Weapons, Contraband Cigarettes, and Endangered Species
Finally, Justice Stevens writes, "Prohibiting the intrastate posses-
sion or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and
commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that prod-
uct.'' In support of this claim, he cites federal statutes 130 criminaliz-
ing possession of contraband cigarettes, 1 ' nuclear/biological weap-
ons and plastic explosives,
132 and artifacts of endangered species.
In one sense, Stevens has a point. Unlike the civil rights, labor, and
environmental laws just discussed, the statutes he now cites are simi-
lar to the CSA in that the mere "act" of possession is a federal crime
in all cases. 134 With all these laws, furthermore, Congress seeks to sup-
press interstate markets that it legitimately seeks to destroy. Nonethe-
less, I assert that these laws do not establish Congress's authority to
imprison Monson and Raich and that Justice Stevens once again fails
to give the second Lopez rule its due.
To begin, citation of these laws simply attempts to derive ought
from is- In effect, says Justice Stevens, since Congress has ignored the
second Lopez rule and thus far has gotten away with it, the rule does
not exist. Yet this simply assumes what must be proven, i.e., that if
challenged, these statutes would be sustained as exercises of Con-
129 Raich, 545 U.S. at 26. Justice Stevens's use of a key passage merits a close look. As he
quotes from Lopez,
Section 9 2 2(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce"
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Sec-
tion 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that
arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggre-
gate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (footnote omitted).
Here is the thing to notice: Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusion follows immedi-
ately after, and thus rests on both premises in the first two sentences, Justice Stevens tries to
make it seem as though it only rests on the second premise. Thus, even if the second premise is
valid and satisfied in Raich, Justice Stevens simply writes as though the first premise, that posses-
sion is not commerce, is not there. He thus tears a unitary formulation in half to reach his re-
sult. Even if we concede the abstract proposition that Raich and Monson's activity must be
criminalized as an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, the CSA, as applied
to the facts of Raich, does not criminalize economic activity. The first premise is not satisfied,
and so ChiefJustice Rehnquist's argument provides no support forJustice Stevens's conclusion.
IO Raich, 545 U.S. at 26 n.36.
131 See 18 U.S.C. § 2342(a) (2006) (regulating the trafficking of contraband cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco).
132 See id. §§ 175(a), 831 (a), 842(n) (1) (relating to the regulation of biological weapons).
133 See 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2006) (providing for the protection of bald and golden eagles).
The Washington Post editorial expresses a concern in this area as well. See Not About Pot, supra
note 113, at A20 (asking if Congress can protect an endangered species that exists only in a sin-
gle state and may be wiped out by some noncommercial activity).
'.M See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (2006) (regulating the distribution, dispensation, or possession of
controlled substances).
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gress's commerce power. Especially since rulings by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, made while they were federal appellate
judges, suggest that they take seriously the idea that Congress's com-
merce power is not unlimited,135 this fails at a basic level to say any-
thing persuasive to a future Court reconsidering this issue. Second,
unlike cannabis, neither cigarettes, weapons, explosives, nor endan-
gered species is considered life-preserving medicine by a substantial
portion of the U.S. medical community (in the tradition of physicians
throughout the world for millennia). '36 Third, none of these laws di-
rectly conflicts with state law, as in Raich. In none of these cases, that
is, does federal law criminalize a type of possession expressly pro-
tected by state law. 3 7 For even further evidence that these laws do
not justify the ruling in Raich, let us consider them individually.
To begin with Congress's power to criminalize possession of "con-
traband cigarettes," the statutory scheme in question 18 defines this
term as "a quantity in excess of 10,000 cigarettes, which bear no evi-
dence of the payment of applicable State or local cigarette taxes in
the State or locality where such cigarettes are found."' 139 As this sug-
gests, Congress's purpose with this law was to protect state revenue.
By stark contrast to the CSA, this ban on cigarette possession not only
does not undermine state interests, it supports and reinforces state inter-
ests. 40 Since the law is also apparently intended to protect legal inter-
state markets for cigarettes (and thus the legitimate interests of legal
cigarette vendors) from interstate black markets for cigarettes, Con-
gress is clearly and legitimately exercising its commerce power with
this law. Since the CSA seeks to destroy rather than protect the inter-
state market for cannabis, thus, Congress's power to enact 18 U.S.C.
135 See, e.g., Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (indicating the power the Commerce Clause grants
is not unlimited); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286-94 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissent-
ing) (noting the limited scope of Commerce Clause power).
136 See supra note 25 (noting the medicinal usc3 of marijuana).
37 Professor Merrill approves of the use of the rational-basis test in cases like Raich. Merrill,
supra note 42, at 846-47. Contrary to Professor Merrill's endorsement, I submit that where fed-
eral law undermines state law, as the CSA does to the CUA, and the state law can pass the ra-
tional-basis test, as the CUA can, the federal law should prevail only if it survives strict scrutiny.
Althouse, supra note 84, at 786-89; Barnett, supra note 29, at 747. Indeed, in Morrision, even
Justices Souter and Breyer emphasized that the states supported the VAWA, yet they simply dis-
regarded the glaring, inconvenient inconsistency of that fact with those in Raich. United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 653, 703-04 (2000).
138 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (2006).
139 Id. § 2341(2).
140 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 703-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(both celebrating the confluence of federal and state interests as a hallmark of federal laws that
should be upheld against Commerce Clause challenge).
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§ 2342 provides no analog for its power to criminalize Monson and
Raich's activity. 
141
Justice Stevens's second example of laws criminalizing mere pos-
session are those governing biological weapons, plastic explosives,
and nuclear materials. As with environmental laws, however, Con-
gress's power to enact such laws is plausibly rooted in the Common
Defense Clause. Indeed, this clause applies with added force here,
since possession of such materials has no purpose other than to
threaten public safety. Statutes criminalizing possession of such ma-
terials thus function not to regulate commerce, but to prevent mass
physical attacks on the public, such as those experienced on 9/11.
They plainly function to protect "the common Defence."
Finally, Justice Stevens references the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA). With this and related laws,14 3 of course, Congress pur-
sues not just a legitimate, but a compelling goal-that of conserving
the ecosystem, 144 the web of life on which human life depends. As
with the environmental and weapons and explosives laws, thus, Con-
gress's power to enact such a law can plausibly be based on its author-
ity to provide for "the common Defence." If that seems a stretch, it is
far less a stretch than Justice Stevens's definition of economic activity,
for the reasons given above.14 5 After Raich, moreover, federal law pro-
tects endangered nonhuman species, while denying endangered hu-
mans what physicians widely consider life-saving medicine. Thus,
even if we place non-human life on a par with human life, the CSA
still embodies an absurd, irrational, indefensible inconsistency in our
law.146 It is hard to take seriously the claim that the need to suppress
141 At a deeper level, this example illustrates again the absurdity of this part of the U.S. War
on Drugs. In citing 18 U.S.C. § 2342 as an example of legitimate federal law, Justice Stevens
supports the tobacco companies' interests in selling the most addictive, destructive drug on the
planet, not something that physicians for millenia throughout the world, and since the 1850's
in the U.S., have considered medicine. See supra note 25 (listing of sources that detailed the
historical medicinal uses of marijuana).
142 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). See supra note 88, which celebrates Raich and its reliance
on the comprehensive scheme principle to rule for Congress, since, in the author's view, this
principle is the best way to uphold the ESA's take provision. See also Adler, supra note 24, at 775
(analyzing ESA in the context of the Commerce Clause). As much as I share Professor Adler's
view that possession is properly not commerce for Article I, Section 8 purposes, even he does
not address how Congress can protect endangered species without criminalizing possession.
143 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006) (covering the possession of migratory birds).
I" Among the purposes of the ESA is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved .... " Id.
§ 1531(b).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 101-103.
146 If there are reasons to justify such inconsistency, e.g., congressional findings that there are
too few eagles and too many humans in the United States, they should be made explicit in the
congressional record. Professor Parry assures us that biopolitics, of which the CSA and Raich
are a part, is an aspect of the enlightenment project of reason. See John T. Parry, "Society Must be
[Regulated] ": Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
853, 877 (2005) ("Indeed, biopolitics simply reflects the enlightenment project of promoting
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the market for artifacts of dead animals justifies denying protection
to living humans, especially where state law provides such protection.
While Justice Stevens does not expressly overrule the second Lopez
rule, he simply ignores it and its underlying principle. Although Ar-
reason in place of 'superstition' and arbitrary power."). For the reasons presented, I reject this
characterization. As Professor Pushaw adds, "ignor[ing] the language of the Commerce
Clause ... often inflicts serious real-world harms. For instance, after Raich no state may help its
citizens who are enduring constant pain that can be relieved only through the controlled use of
marijuana. It is precisely to allow such a state response to noncommercial social problems that
the Commerce Clause contains the languages it does." Pushaw, supra note 27, at 912.
Raich thus answered the question whether federal marijuana law preempts contrary state
marijuana law-it does. Yet it did not clarify whether the right claimed by Angel Raich is a fun-
damental right, and so she went back to federal court seeking a ruling to this effect. See Raich v.
Gonzales, No. 03-15481, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 5834, at *8 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007) (stating that
Raich argued that the CSA was unconstitutional because it infringed her fundamental rights
protected by the Fifth and Ninth Amendments). The Ninth Circuit has now ruled against her
on this claim, but it left open the possibility that she might qualify for the defense of necessity if
she were criminally prosecuted. See id. at *48 (holding that Raich's common law necessity de-
fense is not foreclosed, but that the asserted right to use medicinal marijuana has not gained
the traction on a national scale to be deemed fundamental); Jesse McKinley, Dying Woman Losses
Appeal on Maijuana as Medication, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at A18 (noting that federal appel-
late judges had ruled against Raich). If the Supreme Court eventually recognizes the right
claimed by Angel Raich as fundamental, then the drug war, or at least part of it, will be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny. This is a sobering thought, for this part of the drug war can not even
pass rational basis scrutiny.
To illustrate, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), created a limited constitutional right to ob-
tain an abortion, thus terminating innocent potential/likely human life. Whatever one's view
of the law and morality of abortion, the harms caused by a sick patient consuming cannabis in
the privacy of her home in order to ease her suffering and preserve her innocent actual human
life cannot possibly be greater than those caused by abortion. Congress, accordingly, has no
rational basis to deny the right claimed by Angel Raich while Roe (and Casey) remain the law.
As another illustration, federal law either regulates, or allows states to regulate, alcohol and
tobacco. Notwithstanding the well-known harms from these substances, this is as it should be,
for adults in a free society have the presumptive right to decide what shall be in the most private
spaces of all, their bodies. Beyond its regulation of tobacco and alcohol, thus, federal law re-
flects this principle of presumptive adult bodily autonomy in other ways, such as an adult
woman's right to decide whether she shall have a fetus inside her body and an adult man's right
to decide whether he shall have another man's penis inside his body. There are justifiable ex-
ceptions to the principle in some contexts of course, like the laws governing smoking in restau-
rants, driving under the influence of alcohol, and using steroids in professional sports. Yet the
presumption of bodily autonomy remains a basic feature of our law.
While alcohol and tobacco are thus properly regulated under our law, the private adult con-
sumption of cannabis is completely prohibited, even on a doctor's recommendation for me-
dicinal purposes under an otherwise valid state law. There is no remotely rational basis for such
an inconsistency in the law. Although the government's interest in preventing harms from
drunk-driving and second-hand smoke are compelling, its interest in preventing a sick patient
from privately consuming doctor-prescribed medicine is not even legitimate, at least not in a
society that retains basic decency. Nonetheless, while alcohol can legally be consumed in public
it is a crime to consume cannabis even in private. This is notjnst an inconsistency in our law
but one of an exponential nature for which, again, there is simply no rational basis. As for ster-
oids, however important society's interest may be in fair professional sports competition, it is
trivial compared to what Angel Raich has at stake.
I conclude that if the Court ever rules that Angel Raich has asserted a fundamental right,
the drug war will begin to unravel, for this little corner of it, at least, cannot withstand even ra-
tional-basis scrutiny, nevermind the strict scrutiny a fundamental right would trigger.
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ticle V reserves the amendment power for other constitutional actors,
the Raich majority has in effect amended the Commerce Clause out
of the Constitution. No matter how it tries to dress it up, its ruling is
illegitimate and should be overruled.147 If the Court can interpret a
Constitutional provision, especially one as important as the Com-
merce Clause, to be without meaning, a written constitution is a
sham. Chief Justice John Marshall's deceptively simple observation in
Marbury thus rings true: "It can not be presumed that any clause in
the constitution is intended to be without effect .... The powers of
the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not
be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."
48
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued that while Justice Stevens's reasons for ruling for
Congress in Gonzales v. Raich are understandable, he fails to respond
to the force of the second Lapez rule and its underlying principle,
making his decision ultimately indefensible and one that should be
overruled at the first chance. 4, More immediately, however, it seems
fitting and just that patients, doctors, caregivers, and law enforcement
officials in states with medicinal cannabis laws have declared that
Raich will have little or no impact on their day-to-day operations and
procedures.' 50 After all, states are required neither to assist with DEA
147 Thus, under a Neo-Federalist approach "the CSA should not have been upheld as applied
to Raich, Monson, and others similarly situated." Pushaw, supra note 27, at 910. As Professors
Reynolds & Denning add:
[I] n Raich the Supreme Court seems quite ready to abandon previous lines of jurispru-
dence without much concern for how it will affect its credibility. That's unfortunate, be-
cause the Court's backpedaling on the Commerce Clause is likely to have dramatic and
damaging consequences for the Court's authority with the audience that watches it most
closely, the lower federal courts .... The judiciary is supposed to be about principle, not poli-
tics; at most, principle is supposed to be tempered by politics, not the other way around
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 918-21 (emphasis added).
148 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-76 (1803). As Professor Adler observes,
the Court "displaced judicial review in favor of the political safeguards of federalism." Adler,
supra note 24, at 762.
. See Barnett, supra note 29 (describing how a future Court might limit Raich's impact). As
of this writing, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito both have seats on the Su-
preme Court. Based on ChiefJustice Roberts's opinion in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158,
1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), and Alito's
opinion in United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286-94 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito,J., dissenting), both
seem to take seriously the judicial duty to enforce limits on national power imposed by the sec-
ond Lopez rule. On the other hand, since both are thereby apparently trying to be faithful to
controlling precedent, they may feel compelled to follow Raich's abandonment of the second
Lopez rule. See Blumm and Kimbrell, supra note 88, at 497-98 (predicting that the latter is more
likely, at least for Chief Justice Roberts).
See, e.g., Alabama's Medical Marijuana Advocate to Keep Trying, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 6,
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harassment of sick patients nor to enforce federal prohibition in their
courts, where ninety-nine percent of cannabis prosecutions occur.
This broad reaction illuminates Congress's achievement, through its
War on Drugs, of the status of an "irrelevant tyrant." This is a re-
markable accomplishment, although Congress could not have done it
without the DEA's and the Court's help.
It is true, we saw, that the number of House votes in favor of the
States' Rights to Medical Marijuana Act has increased from 152 in
2003 to 163 in 2006." ' Yet this bill would do nothing more than for-
bid raids and prosecutions under federal law in states with medicinal
cannabis laws. It would not reassign cannabis to Schedule II under
the CSA, much less allow States, under fair readings of Gibbons, Lopez,
and Morrison, to go their own way on cannabis policy. Any congres-
sional "progress" on this issue, in other words, is moving at a glacial
pace at best. If reform momentum is not to be lost, States will have to
continue their trend, along with Canada and many European coun-
tries, toward the more rational, less destructive policy of harm reduc-
tion. 52 If they do, Congress will eventually have to follow, contrary
though such a scenario is to the theory of Raich.
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